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I. INTRODUCTION 
······················································································································· 
THIS Chapter provides an overview of some of the key questions about the regula-
tion of professions and examples of research done to assist in providing answers to 
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those questions. As will be seen, two key issues demanding empirical answers have 
been the degree of tension between the interests of the profession and the public 
in regulation, and the most effective methods of regulating professions. Many of 
the studies described in this Chapter demonstrate well the important relationship 
between theory and practice: empirical studies have proved essential in testing theo-
ries critical of the public-regarding claims of professions themselves. Conversely, 
open-ended inquiries into actual influences in the day-to-day conduct of profes-
sionals have generated theories as to the importance of a broad and complementary 
range of regulatory strategies and sources of regulation and, perhaps ironically for 
empirical legal studies, the limited role that formal law often plays in the face of more 
informal norms. 
Regulation generally is a burgeoning area for empirical legal research, largely due 
to higher rates of formal regulation in society through legislation, regulatory instru-
ments, and codes of conduct but also to a greater appreciation of influences upon 
conduct that go beyond formal law. At its narrowest, regulation may refer only to the 
enforcement oflegal rules by the state or other legally sanctioned formal bodies. But 
empirical studies have confirmed the importance of the much broader view taken 
in the discussion which follows: the regulatory mix to which professions are sub-
ject includes not only regulation applied through entry controls, certification, and 
licensing requirements, professional discipline, and civil and criminal liability, but 
also the influence exerted by professional indemnity insurers and "softer" informal 
forms of regula~ion (including those found in places of practice such as hospitals and 
law firms), and by individual colleagues and consumers of professional services. 
In the next section we look at empirical studies that have sought to provide insight 
into the possible tension that might exist between the interests of the profession and 
the public in regulation before moving to the question of the most effective regula-
tory "mix" for professions. 
II. IN WHOSE INTEREST-THE PROFESSION 
\ 
OR THE PUBLIC? 
Early empirical research into professions did not consider a possible tension between 
the interests of the professions and those of the public and often worked from an 
assumption that, provided a group of service providers could demonstrate all the 
traits of a profession, that group could be trusted to self-regulate with the best inter-
ests of the public in mind~ This assumption largely reflected the work of those, such 
as Parsons (1954), who theorized about a profession that would fully subsume its 
self-intere~t~n the public interest. 
-------------------------~---------------------------------------------------
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However, as critiques of professions and trait theory became more common, such 
research was considered to be of little social value, except to occupational groups 
wanting to legitimate claims to professionalism and prestige. One of the most influ-
ential critiques of the professions was by Larson (1977), who doubted the altruistic 
motives of professions. Instead, she thought they engaged in a professional project of 
market control and collective upward social mobility. This project was not static but 
engaged in "at different times by different groups of professional reformers, using 
the resources that were accessible in their specific environments" (ibid: 104) and 
according to particular pressures they experienced. 
Theoretical work such as this created a need to test these competing claims empir-
ically-did regulation work more to the benefit of members of the professions or 
to those they claimed to serve? A number of aspects of regulation might provide 
insight into this question. We consider some of them below: self-regulation; market 
closure; quality; front-end entry controls; public protection vs. public interest; and 
professional boundaries. Others might include restrictions on advertising and on 
business structures. 
A. Self-regulation 
The power to self-regulate is often seen as a key feature of professionalization, and 
empirical legal studies have taken a close interest in efforts and attitudes around 
obtaining or strengthening statutory self-regulatory powers, including the attitude 
of traditional professionals toward efforts by competing service providers them-
selves to become self-regulating (Kelner et al., 2004). The relationship between the 
state and professions here can be a complex one. The profession wants to be seen as 
fearlessly independent of the state but often requires the support and cooperation 
of the state to entrench and legitimate its monopoly of practice and power to self-
regulate. In some cases it has been found that it is the state that initiates the granting 
of the monopoly to a profession in the state's interests (Dingwall, 2006: 137). The 
complexity of the relationship between the state and professions not only serves to 
warn us of the danger of considering only a dichotomy between professional or pub-
lic interest-because the state itself has an interest-but also makes it a rich area for 
empirical investigation. 
Empirical studies have also attempted to gauge how successfully professions 
have self-regulated in the public interest. This can be measured in many ways. For 
instance, quantitative studies have analyzed the number of complaints upheld after 
investigation by professional bodies, or the number of professionals formally and 
publicly disciplined by their peers. Qualitative, observational studies have provided 
valuable insights into phenomena not easily quantified, such as how professionals 
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respond when they believe their own work or that of a colleague may have caused 
harm to a consumer. 
Some studies into the efficacy of self-regulation have been criticized for too read-
ily assuming causal relationships. For instance, quantitative studies that analyzed 
the number of disciplinary prosecutions by regulators and the outcomes of pros-
ecutions as the basis for conclusions about the degree of self-interest were some-
times criticized as overly simplistic. Halliday (198T 350 ), in his empirical study of the 
Chicago Bar Association, sought a more nuanced approach than "vulgar monopo-
listic theories" relating to self-regulation that discounted the possibility of multiple 
causes and motivations, complaining of the conclusions in some other studies that: 
one consequence or even intent of professionalism becomes the raison d 'etre of the entire 
professionalization enterprise. The part is taken for the whole. Latent consequences become 
explicit intents; accompanying motives become sole bases of action. Results of profession-
alization are assumed to be the outcome of a professional "project." In a word, the entire 
interpretative model is overdetermined. 
In a similar vein, Pue (1990: 405) notes that professional discipline is only one way in 
which a profession can control its members and is critical of the assumption made by 
some researchers that a lack of formal professional discipline necessarily assumes a 
failure to self-regulate and more particularly, a lack of will to self-regulate. 
We will take up Pue's distinction between formal and informal regulation later in 
this Chapter, but his comment also reflects greater recognition that there is no simple 
or linear relationship between intentions and regulatory outcomes and further, that 
regulation might sometimes simultaneously serve the interest ofboth the profession 
and the public (Parker, 1999: 119). In recognition of this, qualitative studies that seek 
to explore the state of mind and aspirations of professionals have become more com-
mon. Such studies have recognized that, despite the best intentions of professionals, 
structural impediments or a lack of resources or expertise may restrict their abil-
ity to implement their public-regarding aspirations. Conversely, some studies have 
documented the frustrations felt by professionals who feel less able to provide opti-
mal care to consumers in bureaucratic settings where self-regulation is weakened 
and that appear to the professional to prioritize managerialist concerns of cost and 
time efficiencies over expertise and optimal outcomes for individual consumers. 
Self-regulation in the public interest assumes colleagues will take some action 
when they become concerned about the conduct of their colleagues. Numerous . 
studies have found professionals reluctant to adversely comment or report on the 
work of their colleagues (e.g., Waring, 2005). Agreement on the reasons for this 
reluctance has proved more elusive. For those who believe self-regulation is part of 
a profession's self-serving project, this is taken as clear evidence that they cannot be 
trusted to self-regulate. Others argue that the reasons are many and more complex, 
and might include that colleagues consider quality difficult to measure, or that it is 
a breach of the autonomy of individual professionals for others to comment on their 
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work. Nonetheless, empirical evidence of a disinclination to take action has obvious 
implications for claims to self-regulation. 
B. ~arketclosure 
Another key feature of professions is that members have been given an exclusive 
right to provide certain services. In other words, there is market closure. The usual 
justification is that this is necessary in order to serve the public interest. Such claims 
spawn a number of empirical questions. These include: how such monopolies came 
about; how they have changed over time; what part the state, professions them-
selves, and interest groups have played in their creation and maintenance; and the 
degree to which such closure has enhanced or detracted from the best interests of 
the public. 
Empirical studies might consider how market closure protects the public in an 
absolute sense. For instance, what evidence is there that services provided by pro-
fessionals lead to fewer adverse events or are of generally higher quality than those 
provided by unqualified individuals? A distinction needs to be drawn between 
protecting the interests of current consumers of professional services ('1absolute" 
protection) and protecting the wider public interest, including protecting members 
of the public seeking at least some level of service ("relative" protection). We will 
look at studies exploring a more "absolute" understanding of protection in more 
detail first before exploring the notion of public protection in a wider, more rela-
tive, sense. 
C. Quality 
One way to test the claim that monopoly is in the public interest is to consider how well 
non-professionals can provide a similar service. It will be difficult to get comparative 
empirical data if a profession's monopoly is strictly enforced; but as discussed more 
fully later, professionals have policed the boundaries of their monopolies with vary-
ing degrees of vigilance, and it is perhaps no coincidence that it is in less lucrative 
areas of practice, such as legal aid (Moorhead et al., 2003) and tribunal work (Kritzer, 
1998) that researchers have found adequate numbers of non-professionals providing 
assistance to make comparison possible. 
In the past it was generally agreed that it was difficult to assess the quality 
of the types of services traditionally supplied by professionals. Indeed, this was 
one justification for giving a monopoly over the supply and regulation of the ser-
vice to professionals in the first place-only this highly educated and certified 
l 
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group had the necessary knowledge and insight to regulate the quality of ser-
vices provided; and so they would need to be trusted to self-regulate in the public 
interest. Nevertheless, some (including Moorhead et al. in the United Kingdom 
(2003)) have attempted to study objectively the relative quality of services pro-
vided by, and the relative competence levels of professionals and unregulated 
non-professional providers of, legal services. Studies such as this, which aim to 
assess quality and competence against an objective standard, face methodological 
difficulties. Service recipients are the most available source of information, but 
may lack expertise or give only subjective accounts influenced by their satisfac-
tion with the outcome or the professional's "bedside manner." If we accept that 
professional status is based at least partly on technical expertise, informational 
asymmetry, and professional mystique, reports from user groups may be useful 
for measuring consumer perceptions of professional competence, but are of much 
less value to the researcher seeking some objective measure of quality. Moorhead 
et al. overcame this difficulty by supplementing client surveys with covert obser-
vation and assessment by trained "dummy" clients and external peer review of 
files. Their study concluded that there was very little difference in the quality of 
the services provided by the professionals and the unregulated service providers 
respectively. 
Given the difficulties of measuring quality directly, some studies have sought to 
use proxies for quality, such as the length of time a patient may need to wait for 
dental assistance. Not surprisingly, the value of proxies such as these has sometimes 
been questioned. 
As we will see later, empirical work has alerted us to the significance of informal 
influences as well as formal mechanisms in regulating professional conduct. Of 
the formal influences, complaints and professional discipline have often been con-
sidered of central importance, and it is largely through complaints and discipline 
that professionals have traditionally exercised self-regulation. We have mentioned 
some of the shortcomings of complaints and disciplinary systems already, aris-
ing both from the reluctance of professionals to report their colleagues and the 
failure of clients, for various reasons, to detect and complain about sub-standard 
work. More fundamentally, some theorists attribute to complaints and discipli-
nary systems very little power to explain the professional project of self-regulation 
and the way self-regulation can be used to promote the interests of professions. 
For instance, Larson mentions professional discipline in her 244-page monograph 
only in a footnote (1977: 229). This may be because by the time a complaint is made, 
the professional in question has already been deemed fit and proper to join the 
ranks of the profession, and it might prove difficult now to successfully portray 
him or her as a "bad apple" and punish them or expel them from the profession. 
Instead, Larson gives much closer attention to "front-end" controls such as bar-
riers to education and qualification, and enforcement of monopolies over areas of 
practice. 
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D. Front-end entry controls 
Not surprisingly then, given their importance to such theoretical critiques of the 
professions, much empirical work has been done on entry controls and restricted 
practice. Comparisons of the cost of education or pass rates in entrance exams 
(Schenarts, 2oo8) with subsequent incomes, cost, supply, or quality in particular 
professions have led to conclusions that some professions were manipulating entry 
controls to maximize their own income and prestige with little eye to the best inter-
ests of the public. However, some such studies have been criticized as being simplis-
tic and for failing to take account of the many possible factors at play in determining 
the cost, supply, and quality of professionals. These include innumerable factors 
beyond the cost of education, including some that may not spring immediately to 
mind, such as quality of life, tax rates, and mortality. For instance, while empirical 
studies might show that physicians earn 32.5% more than dentists and that only half 
of this can be accounted for by the higher education costs incurred by physicians, 
it would be wrong to conclude from this that physicians were benefiting from mar-
ket imperfections if other evidence suggests that physicians work longer hours than 
dentists or experience higher levels of taxation or work-related mortality (Olsen, 
2ooo: 1024). Rhode (1985) examined the way character requirements were applied 
by various states of the United States in individual applications for admission and 
concluded that there was great inconsistency among them. This, combined with 
other empirical and theoretical work suggesting the questionable predictive ability 
of character testing, led Rhode to argue that the front-end controls applied through 
admission procedures could not be justified and were more likely to be part of the 
legal profession's effort to restrict competition and enhance status. 
E. "Relative" public protection 
The research considered so far has been concerned primarily with a public interest 
in protecting the interest of consumers in the availability of high-quality profes-
sional services ("absolute" protection). However, there is also a broader public inter-
est in maintaining the supply of an adequate range of professional services at an 
affordable cost ("relative" protection). Much empirical work has been done to test 
the degree to which professional monopolies and other regulatory controls might 
be adding unnecessarily to the cost of professional services or limiting their supply 
(Yang et al., 2008) or range. 
For 'instance, Paterson et al. (2003, "IHS study") were asked by the European 
Commission to consider "the justification for and effects of restrictive rules and 
regulations in the professions" across Europe. The study compared the legislation, 
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regulations, and codes of practice governing the legal, accountancy, architecture, 
and pharmacy professions in a number of member states of the European Union, 
and linked this with an assessment of the economic effects of different degrees 
of regulation to determine if various levels of regulation were "too high." The 
implicit bias in such an approach is toward deregulation and perhaps an assump-
tion that preexisting levels of regulation have been primarily in the interests of 
the professions rather than the public. Indeed, the IHS study took it as a given 
that less regulation, greater competition, and lower fees were intrinsically good 
outcomes, and did not test or control for quality. The implied assumption that 
quality remains constant regardless of the intensity of regulation was the basis 
for much of the later criticism of this study (Henssler and Killian, 2003; Terry, 
2009). 
Professionals may face competition not only from foreigners seeking local rights 
of practice. The challenge may also come from within. For instance, alternative pro-
viders of health care, such as naturopaths and practitioners of traditional Chinese 
medicine, to name just two groups, have become increasingly popular with con-
sumers seeking alternative forms of care. While the medical profession has often 
lobbied hard against the recognition of such alternative health services, Dingwall 
(2006: 136) has noted that this is not always the case: in some situations the medical 
profession has recognized that the existence of alternative health service-providers 
has in fact increased the consumption of health services rather than threatened the 
market and authority of the medical profession. 
To close markets effectively, it would seem necessary to define the boundaries 
of that market. But as we will see below, more recent critical empirical studies 
have documented the poor track record of professions in being able to adequately 
define the boundaries of their area of monopoly, and their differing responses 
when it might seem that non-professionals or other professional groups were 
encroaching. This indeterminacy has provided some ammunition to those who 
argue that regulation is primarily for the benefit of the profession rather than the 
public. 
F. Professional boundaries 
It may seem curious to those who have not studied the regulation of professions 
closely that it has sometimes proved difficult to define the sort of work that comes 
within a particular profession's monopoly of practice. It would seem hard for any 
regulator to enforce an amorphous boundary. Fournier (2ooo: 71) describes stud-
ies that have tracked the way in which particular professional fields of knowledge 
such as medicine and accounting (Hopwood, 1987) have come into existence and 
continued to evolve. 
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Perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of defining an area of monopoly to 
a level that would satisfy courts in formal prosecutions of non-members for 
unauthorized practice in breach of the monopoly, professional groups have 
sometimes cooperated to carve out areas of monopoly for each other (American 
Bar Association, 1995: 23). While such agreements clearly benefit the professions 
involved, empirical studies have sometimes found it difficult to identify how they 
benefit the public: while they might save a regulator the expense of a prosecution, 
the nebulous boundary may suggest a prosecution would not have been war-
ranted in any case. 
If a profession itself appears at times ambivalent about enforcing boundaries, 
their public protective function might seem questionable. Particularly if profes-
sionals appear most active in policing the supply of services for which they are most 
handsomely rewarded, rather than those of most risk to consumers, the public-
regarding nature of the professions must be questioned. As noted earlier in our 
discussion of testing the quality of professional services, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that it was in the less lucrative areas of legal aid (Moorhead et al., 2003) and 
tribunal work (Kritzer, 1998) that researchers encountered a more lax enforcement 
of boundaries that made it possible to compare the quality of services provided 
by professionals and non-professionals. It is perhaps notable in this regard that 
some definitions of unauthorized practice include only the supply of services 'for 
reward-the professions appear to have made much less noise about services pro-
vided for free. 
One often-cited example of an empirical study that casts professions in a more 
positive light than some of those mentioned previously is that ofHalliday (1987), who 
took an optimistic view of the potential of professionalization to benefit the public. 
He sought to overcome what he saw as simplistic theories of professions that assumed 
a simple dichotomy between self- and public interest. Larson had theorized that the 
impetus for professional groups to seek greater market control and higher social sta-
tus changed over ~lace and time, depending on the state ofknowledge, markets, and 
resources available to professional groups to mobilize (1977: 104). Halliday devel-
oped this historical imperative and applied it to the Chicago Bar Association. He 
conceded that the association pursued its own interests when establishing its pro-
fessionallegitimacy; but, once established, it became much more outward-looking, 
displayed much more altruism, and performed a greater civic role-in other words, 
went "beyond monopoly." Only in future periods of severe public scrutiny would it 
feel a need to refocus its energies on self-interest. 
However, it would be wrong to use Halliday's work as affirmation that pro-
fessions will regulate themselves primarily in the public interest. According to 
Halliday, one precondition of going "beyond monopoly" is that a profession's 
privileged monopoly position be entrenched; but regulation that truly pursues 
the public interest may weaken that monopoly. Second, while, as Halliday noted, 
the association continued to be interested in "soft" forms of regulation, such 
\ 
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as continuing legal education, licensing of specialist practitioners, and office 
management, even when its monopoly was entrenched (ibid: 353), its interest 
in ethics and grievance committees and the "harder" end of regulation that 
could lead to professional discipline and expulsion from the profession in fact 
declined during these times of prosperity (ibid: 352). This fluctuating interest 
in discipline casts doubt on the degree to which the association could effec-
tively and fully self-regulate in the public interest. It also highlights the impor-
tant symbolic role that professional discipline plays in a profession's quest for 
legitimacy: discipline sends powerful messages about character and integrity 
in a way that more mundane activities such as continuing legal education and 
office management cannot. 
A large proportion of empirical studies of regulation of the professions have 
been carried out in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, 
and have had a particular interest in various combinations of state, self-, and 
co-regulation and how these might enhance or detract from a profession's social 
power, status, and legitimacy. This is not surprising given that the traditional 
professions of law, medicine, and the clergy were more significant sources of 
social status in English-speaking countries than in Europe, where status was tied 
more to a person's place of education or employment: hence, Freidson's reference 
to the "Anglo-American disease of professionalism" (1983: 26). As we move out-
side Anglo-American jurisdictions to places where less social prestige is derived 
from professional status and self-regulation, it is not surprising to see less inter-
est in empirical studies into professions and their regulation. Some have argued 
that "Europeanization" -the expectation that professions will be similarly regu-
lated across the various countries of the European Union-will alter the pre-
existing regulatory balance between profession and state, and thereby diminish 
professional control and status; but Freidson's comment suggests that UK-based 
researchers will perhaps be more concerned about exploring this than academics 
in mainland Europe. 
In summary, despite the empirical studies that havebeen undertaken, we still do 
not know much about the degree to which regulation has worked in the interests 
of professions and to the disadvantage of the public. Part of the difficulty has been 
in obtaining data-protected professions can be coy about disclosing their levels 
of income, adverse service outcomes, and other relevant information. But, as the 
preceding discussion has sought to demonstrate, much of the problem lies in the 
complexity of the phenomena being investigated and the need for caution before 
ascribing causal relationships. 
Having looked at some of the empirical work exploring the degree to which 
regulation of the professions has or has not protected the public, we turn now 
to a second, important area of empirical research dealing with the optimal mix 
of various regulatory techniques and sources of regulation, both formal and 
informal. 
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III. BEST REGULATORY MIX 
We looked at self-regulation earlier in the context of a profession's ability to regulate 
in the public interest. In this section we include the question of self-regulation but 
consider it in combination with other potential forms of regulation and with dif-
ferent questions in mind: what regulatory techniques are used by effective regula-
tors; what sources of regulation exist and can be best utilized for optimal regulatory 
outcomes; and what other, less formal influences on the conduct of professionals 
exist. We will look first at the regulatory techniques used by regulators-whether 
professional bodies or external-before turning to the question of multiple sources 
of regulation and finally, informal influences on conduct. 
A. Regulatory techniques-the regulatory pyramid 
Until empirical work uncovered a much richer picture, it was generally assumed that 
regulation consisted primarily of top down "command and control" of those regu-
lated: regulatory agencies charged with enforcement demanded compliance, and 
failures to comply were met with more punitive responses by regulators. However, 
innumerable studies, such as the examination by Braithwaite et al. of regulat<;>ry 
styles of the regulator and perceptions of those being regulated within nursing 
homes (1990 ), found a much more complex picture. They found that most regulatory 
activity occurs at the base of what later Braithwaite coined a regulatory "pyramid." 
Here at the base, regulators show respect for the autonomy of those they regulate 
and encourage personal monitoring. They engage in dialogue and employ incentives 
and encouragement to comply (in summary, they "speak softly"). However, effective 
regulators also ensure they carry a "big stick" while speaking softly and respond 
to failures to comply by escalating up the regulatory pyramid to more and more 
mandatory intervention and coercion by the regulator. At the apex of the pyramid 
is the regulator's "last resort" (Hawkins, 2002)-formal prosecution for regulatory 
breach. Empirical work continues to be done in exploring some of these theories in 
the context of professions and professional places of work, and Braithwaite (2009: 
31) has emphasized how important these regulatory questions are in the context of 
hospitals today, with the sheer range of professions working together using complex 
technology on vulnerable patients. 
Studies of regulatory styles have also emphasized the normative content of much 
decision-making by regulators at all levels of the pyramid, including a tendency for 
regulators to require moral blame before they externally report or prosecute con-
duct, regardless of whether the legislation they are charged with enforcing purports 
to impose strict liability offenses (Carson, 1970; Hawkins, 2002). 
l 
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B. Regulatees 
Similarly, just as empirical studies were important to test assumptions that com-
mand and control was the only style of regulation employed by regulators, they also 
provided important information about those subjected to regulation. The poten-
tially corrupting influences on professional conduct were sometimes assumed to be 
the result of inherent character flaws-the "bad apple" who slipped through front-
end professional admission controls. Qualitative, exploratory studies sought to find 
out from professionals themselves what they perceived to be the various influences 
over their conduct, both positive and negative, and their relative weight. Rather than 
assume that punitive, formal regulatory law was the primary source of influence, 
such studies have provided useful information as to the relative (and sometimes 
much greater) influence of factors such as client or employer support or pressure, a 
concern to please colleagues, reputational concerns, a desire to maximize income or 
prestige, workload, and training. 
Empirical evidence such as this, which suggests that effective regulation requires 
regulators to use a mix of persuasion and command-and-control, and to acknow-
ledge and harness the aspirational desires of those regulated, has also led to theoret-
ical arguments about the futility of imposing legislative changes that move too far 
into risk-based, objective, and blame-free approaches: reporting of failure and risk 
often includes a normative element because it is reactive and arises out of dissatis-
faction; and most would expect it to be part of a regulator's responsibility to allocate 
individual responsibility where necessary (e.g., Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter, 2008: 79). 
While Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter were referring to regulation of the medical profes-
sion, their warnings should also be heeded by those designing effective regulation 
for other professions, particularly in Anglo-American countries where professions 
have strong, traditional aspirations of self-regulation and individual responsibility 
(Dingwall, 2006: 139). 
In addition to studies into what mix of regulatory strategies a single professional 
body or regulatory agency might use, others have attempted to identify and measure 
the regulatory impact of a much broader range of sources, including civil liability 
and insurers. 
C. Multiple regulators 
Past empirical studies into the professions can take some of the credit for revealing 
to us the pluralist nature of regulation. Unitary approaches were once assumed to 
be the only legitimate form of regulation, whether it was a professional body impos-
ing its will on members or an external, independent statutory body responding to 
proven breaches of standards. Today it is accepted that a much broader range of 
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sources of regulation exists beyond dedicated regulatory agencies and is desirable in 
the regulation of professions as in all regulatory contexts. The role of the empirical 
researcher then becomes to provide evidence as to what regulatory mix exists or is 
optimal in various circumstances and for various professions. 
The theoretical work ofWilkins (1992) has had a lasting impact on thinking about 
the regulation of the legal profession because it took a broader view of regulation 
than simply licensing, complaints, and discipline, which had been the earlier focus. 
Wilkins proposed a four-celled typology of regulation comprising disciplinary, lia-
bility, institutional, and legislative controls. Wilkins was not seeking to explore the 
regulatory techniques used by a single agency, as discussed in the previous section. 
Instead, his focus was the multiple sources of potential regulation, and his work 
struck a chord when it was published in 1992 because it came at a time when many 
empirical studies had focused on complaints and disciplinary systems applicable to 
lawyers and there was less theoretical acknowledgement, let alone empirical work 
reflecting the regulatory potential, of other parts of Wilkins' framework, such as 
tort liability, controls applied by courts and other similar institutions, and legislative 
forms of control applied by state administrative bodies. Wilkins theorized that it was 
important to consider who had the greatest incentive to enforce high professional 
standards and argued that in some contexts, disciplinary and liability controls have 
a tendency to duplicate each other and have limited regulatory impact, given that 
they both only respond to small client, agency problems such as overcharging and 
neglect: large, powerful clients are unlikely to complain when lawyers engage in 
misconduct under pressure from the client. 
We noted earlier the degree of informational asymmetry between professionals 
and consumers and the lack of transparency around professional conduct, making 
it difficult for unsophisticated consumers of professional services to identify poor-
quality work-and how this fact was used as a justification for professional monop-
oly and self-regulation. It also has consequences for determining the most effective 
source of regulation. Even when clients do identify, and suffer as a result of, poor 
quality work, many factors determine whether or not they will go on to lodge a com-
plaint. They may lack the resources or skill to complain. Where a third party, such as 
an insurer or a legal aid or sickness fund, has paid for the provision of services, it may 
be less likely that either the consumer or funder of the service has sufficient inform a-
tion or incentive to lodge a complaint, creating a moral hazard for enforcement. 
Clients are not always a good source of control for other reasons. Clients will 
sometimes profit from the actions of their professional adviser, such as where an 
accountant or lawyer assists in a client's scheme of tax evasion, and clients will 
do all they can to hide the assistance provided by the professional. On the other 
hand, some consumers of professional services are so large and powerful that the 
professional may need protection-or at least guaranteed independence-from 
the client. The most dramatic and intractable example of this arises in the auditing 
profession where client and market controls are obviously inadequate when the 
i 
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legitimacy of the audit depends on the auditor's ability to demonstrate independ-
ence from the client. Empirical work has been done to find the effective form of 
regulation to protect auditor independence, although the results so far have proved 
inconclusive (Ramsay, 2001). While institutional controls, such as restraint pro-
ceedings in the courts, may effectively deal with externalities resulting from the 
provision of professional services, as when a lawyer assists a client whose activities 
cause harm to the community, Wilkins thought that such forms of control were 
vulnerable to misuse by large, powerful clients for tactical purposes against less 
well-resourced parties, thus reinforcing preexisting inequalities of access to the 
courts. 
Empirical work in the United States has attempted to test some aspects ofWilkins' 
theory. A study by Joy in 2004 found that there was little duplication in the appli-
cation of institutional (Rule n) sanctions and professional discipline. Similarly, 
many of the studies of regulation of medical professions surveyed by Olsen (2ooo) 
looked at the interaction between medical malpractice and tort and licensing law. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, claims were made that the medical and legal professions 
were at least partly responsible for an explosion in the cost of tort claims, and that 
this justified the placing of further layers of regulation upon them. Empirical stud-
ies proved extremely useful in testing the veracity of such claims of a crisis and its 
potential culprits (Harvard, 1990). Work also continues to be done on the impact of 
the new sources of regulation-liability, insurance, and otherwise-on such factors 
as supply, cost, efficiency, defensive practice, and patient outcomes (e.g., Kessler and 
McClellan, 1996), although the results remain inconclusive and contested (Faure, 
2009: 488). 
We mentioned earlier that research hypotheses around the degree to which 
regulation promotes professional self-interest more than public interest may not 
strike a similar chord outside the United States and United Kingdom as they 'do in 
those countries. Equally, empirical findings on the existing and optimum regu-
latory "mix" may also be of doubtful relevance outside those same jurisdictions 
where there has traditionally been most interest in studying professions. However, 
the "policy pull" (Sarat and Silbey, 1988) on the empirical researcher to carry out 
comparative studies of regulatory mixes is becoming quite strong as a result, for 
instance, of the expectation that professions will be regulated across the European 
Union or, at least, that there will be greater harmonization of regulatory laws. 
This, of course, was the driver for the IHS study mentioned earlier (Paterson et al., 
2003). 
Comparative work on the regulatory mix is underway. Empirical studies have 
concluded that health professions in the United States are much more subject to 
regulation by the medical defense organizations and insurers that provide them with 
indemnity than by state management of markets-as occurs in the United Kingdom 
(Dingwall, 2006: 132). In Germany, sickness funds play a major role in regulation 
because of their strong economic interest in restricting the cost to them of financing 
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health care, leading to less concern about regulating quality than in state-centered 
forms of regulation such as that in the United Kingdom (Kuhlmann, 2009). 
Each source of regulation is likely to reflect its particular priorities and rai-
son d' etre: sickness funds in Germany focus primarily on reducing cost; internal 
ombudsman schemes try to settle consumer complaints as quickly and informally 
as possible, for instance by requiring the professional service-provider to apologize 
to the patient or client; a professional indemnity insurer will be concerned lest infor-
mal apologies or payments compromise its control over civil liability proceedings, 
but will still be pleased to see any civil claim resolved to the satisfaction of the indi-
vidual plaintiff without the expense of court proceedings. A state-based regulatory 
body may be more concerned to uncover and respond to systemic failings in the 
provision of services by professionals. These various forms of regulation may be in 
tension with one another. For instance, the best way to ((protect" a person already 
harmed by a professional may be to compensate that person for their losses; but if 
such compensation is provided on an informal, confidential basis without a public 
hearing into the harmful conduct in the form (for instance) of a civil trial for profes-
sional negligence or professional disciplinary proceedings, the result may be paten-
tial harm to the public more broadly and into the future as the professional remains 
in practice (Abel, 2003: 489). 
D. Informal regulation 
For many years, work has been done on the formal and informal ways in which the 
work of health professionals is controlled. Heimer (1999) spent a year in the field 
observing legal and other norms guiding interactions among doctors, nurses, and 
non-professionals in a neonatal ward. She observed daily routines and staff meet-
ings of the neonatal intensive care unit, interviewed staff and parents, and reviewed 
medical records and the laws governing the practice of neonatal law, to provide a 
detailed assessment of the different impact that civil, criminal, and regulatory laws 
had on medical decision-making alongside the influences exerted by the norms of 
medical and familial institutions. She concluded from her observations that laws 
will vary in the degree to which they actually impact on actual behavior within 
organizations when competing against medical and family norms, depending on 
the degree to which the laws were insinuated into daily organizational demands. The 
higher-status health professionals, such as physicians, had a greater say in whether 
or not this occurred. 
Heimer's study is an example of the many studies of informal regulation of the 
medical profession that occurs in hospital settings, which epitomize a group work-
place and are likely to provide optimum opportunities for the operation of infor-
mal influences over conduct. By way of comparison, in 1975 Freidson published 
his seminal article about doctors practicing outside the hospital setting, Doctoring 
'l 
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Together, which recognized the informal controls operating between medical prac-
titioners even when not working closely together on a daily basis. Nelson's Partners 
with Power (1988) was an early study of informal regulation within the legal profes-
sion, focusing on a large organization arguably analogous to a hospital-a big law 
firm. Mather et al.'s work (2001) on divorce lawyers was an important step forward 
because it recognized that even sole-practitioner lawyers operated within various 
communities of practice. While not necessarily within their immediate place of 
work, Mather et al. found that solo lawyers still drew understandings of norms and 
expectations from numerous other communities of practice, such as the profession 
within their state, colleagues from other firms with whom they interacted, and the 
courts and other forums within which they practiced. 
While it is useful to acknowledge the ways in which formal and informal forms 
of regulation can complement each other, it should also be acknowledged that they 
can be in tension. For instance, while there are perhaps advantages for consumers, 
colleagues, and institutions in encouraging private apologies and settlements, these 
may compromise more formal action against the same individual in relation to the 
conduct for which the apology was received. 
E. Comparing the regulatory mix across borders 
Studies comparing the regulatory mix applying to professions in different jurisdic-
tions have become more common in recent times. Such studies may be driven by the 
need for regulation and regulators to respond to the globalization of professional 
practice, which creates at least the perception of a need to establish trans-national 
regulatory frameworks or, alternatively, at least to adapt existing regulatory norms to 
achieve greater harmony among states. For example, Kuhlmann (2009) compared the 
dynamics of the regulation of medical professions in the UK and Germany to identify 
diverse drivers of change and to explain why the state plays a more influential role in 
the United Kingdom. She also found that state support through legislation for self-
regulation by nurses and suppliers of alternative and complementary medicine was 
much less advanced in Germany than in the United Kingdom. She argued that one 
result of this relatively weak state regulation in Germany has been greater "bottom-
up" informal regulation, such as through voluntary quality-support networks (ibid: 
523). Also relevant to the issue of the effective "mix" of regulatory mechanisms across 
traditional borders are studies into the effectiveness oflegal transplants, such as that 
by Dezalay and Garth (2002): they can tell us about the potential for "softer" regulation 
through professional culture and norms across state borders. However, this is not an 
area for the fainthearted empirical researcher. There is much complexity and the dan-
ger of ethno-centric understandings of central concepts, such as "self-regulation" and 
"self-administration," which can have fundamentally different meanings in different 
jurisdictions even among the countries of Europe (Henssler and Kilian, 2003: 13). 
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IV. CoNCLUSION 
What have we learned from empirical studies into the regulation of the professions? 
How successful have they been in testing theories about professions? The answers 
to these questions depend on a number of factors. Certainly, more narrowly framed 
investigations into regulation have sometimes tended to confirm theories that argue 
that regulation often speaks to the interests of the professions themselves rather than 
the public. However, as commentators such as Lewis, Pue, and Halliday have rightly 
pointed out, narrowly framed research questions, for instance ones that focus only 
on formal professional discipline, sometimes make overly wide claims about the 
failure of self-regulation. The empirical studies undertaken to date have alerted us 
to the great complexity of regulation of the professions. Causal relationships and 
intended consequences cannot be assumed. Regulators and those regulated some-
times aspire to high standards in discharging their roles, but are hampered by a lack 
of resources. Regulation might take many forms, and one of the most important 
revelations from empirical studies done to date has been the importance of recog-
nizing and embracing a plurality of regulatory forms and the danger of assuming 
the central importance of law in regulation. We have discovered that often much 
more informal norms most influence the way professionals conduct themselves. The 
ongoing challenge for empirical studies is to find ways to adequately investigate and 
uncover the inter-relationship between various forms of regulation, both formal and 
informal. 
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